Executive Protection in Latin America: How to Compare Firms Across Borders

You have three proposals on your desk for a trip that touches São Paulo, Bogotá and Santiago. All three firms say they are licensed. All three say they operate regionally. You have no reliable way to tell which claim means anything, and the person travelling is your principal.

What you are actually buying is narrower than "safety". It is the board seat in São Paulo, the regulator meeting in Bogotá and the closing dinner in Santiago, all reached on the day they were scheduled. That is the thing a border problem breaks, and it is the thing this framework is built to protect.

The standard advice is to verify the provider’s licence. Across a region, that advice quietly stops working, and almost nobody says so out loud.

Does an executive protection licence work across Latin American borders?

No. A private security licence is national, and often narrower than national. It does not travel, and none of the six countries reviewed here recognises another’s. A firm licensed in one place is unlicensed in the next one, whether it is there for a month or for an afternoon.

Buenos Aires Province puts it in the statute. Ley 12.297, article 21, requires provincial authorisation to provide security services in the province "permanently or transitorily", then adds a sentence most buyers never see: authorisation held in other jurisdictions does not substitute for this requirement. A single day of work is covered.

That is one province. The wider point is that we found no mechanism, in any of the sources reviewed, that lets a credential cross a border in this region. The United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries surveyed eight South American jurisdictions and reported that there are no rules applicable beyond national borders, that extraterritoriality goes unmentioned, and that the export or import of security services is not regulated at all. Several of those regimes have been amended since — Brazil in 2024, Peru across 2021 to 2023, Colombia in 2025 — and we found nothing in the later texts that supersedes the finding. Read it as what it is: no contrary mechanism located, rather than a live 2026 snapshot.

We checked whether the regional bodies fill that gap. We searched Mercosur’s own normative database, the Andean Community’s decisions and the Pacific Alliance’s founding framework, and found no private security licensing provision in any of them. Mercosur does have a general mechanism by which professional bodies in member states can negotiate mutual recognition, and there is no evidence security regulators have ever used it. The Andean instruments on the subject address illicit arms trafficking, not lawful providers.

This is not a limitation of the legal technology. Spain recognises private security qualifications from other European Union states under a 2011 Interior Ministry order. Latin America simply has not built the equivalent.

Who actually regulates private security in each country?

Different bodies, at different levels of government, with different reach. Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru regulate nationally. Argentina regulates by province with no working national law. Mexico splits the job: federal if a firm works in two or more states, state law if it works in one.

The table below is the practical shape of the problem. It is not that the rules are stricter in one country than another. It is that they are differently shaped, so a single checklist cannot be carried from one to the next.

Two entries deserve a note.

Chile changed recently and has not finished changing. Its 2024 private security law came into force on 28 November 2025, replacing a framework that dated back to 1981. The compliance machinery is still phasing in. In May 2026 Congress extended the deadline for banks, cash-transport firms and other obligated entities to file their mandatory security studies from six months to eighteen, pushing it to May 2027, and separately extended the transitional validity of personnel authorisations. The regulator’s stated reason was that without the extension a large share of the country’s working guards would have been left without valid accreditation. The national register the law creates is not yet due. Anyone describing Chile as either unreformed or fully modernised is describing a country that does not currently exist.

Argentina has no functioning national regime. A 1999 national decree exists on paper and was never implemented. Regulation sits with 24 separate jurisdictions. A firm working in Buenos Aires city and Buenos Aires province needs two authorisations, two registered local seats and separately certified people in each.

Where can your protection be armed, and who is allowed to hold the weapon?

Armed protection is lawful in all six countries and gated everywhere by a second authority. Being licensed to provide security never by itself means being allowed to carry. The weapon and the service are almost always approved by different agencies.

Mexico is the clearest illustration. The security regulator issues a favourable opinion on whether a firm’s people need to be armed; only then does the defence ministry issue the collective carry licence that covers them. Colombia works the same way, with the Superintendencia issuing a favourable opinion before the arms permit follows, and it adds a quantitative cap most buyers have never heard of: a maximum of one personal-defence weapon per three guards on the payroll. Chile keeps weapons under a separate control-of-arms statute administered by the defence ministry, where each firearm is individually registered and a guard may carry only one at a time. In Brazil, firearms used in private security are owned by the company and registered federally.

The practical consequence for a buyer is narrow and useful. When a proposal says "armed team", the question that gets a real answer is not whether the firm is licensed. It is which entity holds the weapons authorisation for the country you are entering, and whether that entity is the one signing your contract.

One live caution on Colombia. Reporting indicates a suspension of civilian carry permits was extended through the end of 2026, with exceptions for state forces "and others". Whether licensed private security sits inside that exception is not something we could confirm against the official text, so treat Colombian armed service as a point to verify at the time you travel rather than a settled position.

Can a foreign security firm hold a licence directly?

Almost never, and the barriers are shaped so differently that a firm’s answer tells you how well it actually knows the region. Mexico asks you to incorporate locally. Colombia asks your shareholders to be Colombian people. Those are not variations on a theme.

Mexico requires the provider to be a Mexican natural person or a company incorporated under Mexican law. Mexican nationality attaches to incorporation, not to who owns the shares, and private security does not appear on any of the reserved or ownership-capped activity lists in the foreign investment law. A Mexican subsidiary of a foreign parent can therefore satisfy the test.

Colombia forecloses that route entirely. Its 1994 statute requires the partners of a private security company to be natural persons of Colombian nationality. That excludes foreign individuals and it excludes corporate shareholders of any nationality, including Colombian ones. Companies formed before 1994 with foreign capital were allowed to continue but may not increase that participation. There is no structure a foreign firm can build to hold a Colombian licence.

Peru requires a Peru-domiciled entity with local tax registration. Argentina’s provincial rules require national participation, and Buenos Aires Province requires that partners, directors and attorneys-in-fact be Argentine citizens. Chile requires a Chilean private-law entity, and we found no ownership cap stated in the licensing article, which is not the same as confirming none exists.

Reading across those six answers: a firm that presents itself as directly licensed across Latin America is either describing something other than what it holds, or has not looked.

What actually travels across a border, and what does not?

Very little. Credentials do not transfer. Firearms move only under national import and export licensing, never as part of a travelling team. Armoured vehicles are a controlled category in their own right. What crosses the border is the plan, the intelligence and the accountability.

On firearms, the only hemispheric instrument on point is the 1997 inter-American convention against illicit firearms trafficking, which obliges states to maintain export, import and transit licensing. It adds a licensing burden; it does not create a fast lane.

On vehicles, Argentina treats armoured passenger vehicles as a distinct authorisation category for both permanent and temporary entry. Chile enumerates armoured value-transport vehicles separately in its customs schedule. Brazil requires its own federal inspection for special value-transport vehicles, and we found no route by which a foreign-plated armoured vehicle substitutes for it. One nuance is worth keeping straight, because it is often overstated: armouring a civilian vehicle does not automatically turn it into a military-classified good. Mexico’s military tariff line covers combat-configured vehicles, and a retrofitted civilian SUV is generally classified as a passenger vehicle. Borderline cases turn on a customs ruling rather than a rule of thumb.

There is one narrow exception to the personnel rule, and it is worth knowing precisely because it does not apply to you. Mexico allows its defence ministry to grant temporary carry permits, on a reciprocity basis, to foreign public servants accompanying heads of state, heads of government or ministers on official visits. That is a government-to-government protocol channel. It has no application to a commercial engagement, and a firm that cites it at you is misreading it.

What does the local-partner model mean, and when is it a red flag?

It means the firm holding your contract directs the operation while a locally licensed company executes the regulated armed part under its own authorisation. That is the lawful structure in most of the region. It becomes a red flag when the contracting firm cannot say who is accountable when something goes wrong.

This is not a workaround invented by the industry. Colombia’s own statute contemplates it: locally licensed escorts may serve people connected to companies headquartered outside Colombia, while no provision allows a foreign escort to operate armed in the country. The ownership bars in Mexico and Colombia point the same way, though we should be precise that "subcontracting is required" is an inference from those bars rather than a sentence written in either statute.

The distinction that matters to you is between a firm that commands the operation and a firm that makes an introduction. Both may use local partners. Only one of them answers the phone when a movement goes wrong in a country where it does not hold the licence.

A useful test: ask what happens between vendors. If the ground team in one country and the ground team in the next are separate contracts with separate liability, and the firm you hired sits outside both, you do not have a regional provider. You have a broker with a good deck.

Vanguard Attaché operates this way deliberately and says so: it directs the operation, and the regulated armed component is executed under its command by licensed local partners who hold the national authorisation. It carries errors and omissions cover for its operational direction, while local partners carry the cover their own law makes mandatory.

Which checks still work when you cannot verify a licence?

Structural ones. You cannot audit five regulatory regimes and you should stop trying. What you can assess is whether one identifiable party owns the plan across every border, whether the armed component is lawfully executed in each country, and whether anyone is contractually accountable when the two do not line up.

Four checks survive the border problem.

One accountable principal

Is there a single party responsible for intelligence, planning, command, transport and the ground execution, across the whole itinerary, under one contract? Or does accountability change at each frontier? A good answer names the party and points at the contract. A poor answer describes a network.

This is the check that protects the calendar rather than the paperwork. When the São Paulo board seat, the Bogotá regulator meeting and the Santiago dinner sit on one itinerary, what keeps them reachable is that a single operator owns the route: it holds the advance work and the ground plan for each city, it briefs and verifies the licensed local team that executes the regulated part, and it carries the schedule across the join between them. Three disconnected vendors can each be lawful and still lose you the meeting, because nobody owns the handover. If you are the chief of staff holding this itinerary, that handover is the thing to ask about first.

Lawful execution, asserted as an assurance

The firm should be able to state, without you having to investigate, that all armed work in each country is performed by providers holding that country’s authorisation, and that it verifies those credentials before deployment. Note what this is not: it is not you collecting licence numbers. A provider that hands a client a list of registration numbers to check is outsourcing its own diligence.

Jurisdiction-specific knowledge, tested cheaply

Ask about the country you are least worried about. A firm that knows the region will tell you Argentina is provincial, that Chile’s regime is mid-rollout, and that Colombia’s ownership rule makes direct licensure impossible. A firm that gives you the same answer for every country has one playbook.

Insurance that is real and split honestly

Ask what the contracting firm carries in its own name, and separately what the local executing partner carries under local law. Those are different policies with different triggers. The countries differ here too: Colombia mandates liability cover of at least 400 monthly minimum wages, Mexico takes a surety bond, Peru takes a guarantee bond of 5 UIT and requires a policy only for value transport, and Chile lets a firm substitute a funded reserve for liability insurance. A provider that quotes one global coverage figure for the region has not read any of them.

What should rule a provider out immediately?

Five answers should end the conversation, because each one means the firm is either misdescribing its legal position or has not done the work.

1. It claims to be directly licensed across Latin America, or "regionally licensed". No such licence exists. At best this is loose language about a network; at worst it is a misrepresentation you would inherit.
2. It offers to bring its own armed personnel across a border. Credentials do not transfer. The offer describes something unlawful in every country reviewed here.
3. It gives the same regulatory answer for every country. The regimes are not merely different in strictness, they are different in kind. A single answer means one playbook.
4. It cannot name who is accountable between vendors. If liability changes hands at each frontier and the firm you hired sits outside those contracts, nobody owns the gap.
5. It quotes one insurance figure for the whole region, or cannot separate its own cover from its partners’. The two are different instruments in every country in the table.

What should you ask a firm bidding on regional work?

Six questions. They are designed so that a firm which genuinely works across the region can answer them quickly, and a firm which does not cannot bluff them.

1. Who is the single accountable party for this itinerary, and which entity signs the contract?
2. In each country on the route, which entity performs the armed work, and under whose national authorisation?
3. How do you verify those credentials before deployment, and how recently did you verify them?
4. What changes about your model between the countries on this route, and why?
5. What does your firm carry in insurance in its own name, and what do your local executing partners carry under their own law?
6. If something goes wrong on the second border crossing, who do I call, and who is liable?

Note what is not on that list: any request for the provider’s own registration or licence number. At regional scale a number you cannot interpret from another country is not diligence, it is paperwork. The six questions above test the thing a number cannot: whether anyone is actually accountable across the whole route.

The short version

A licence proves that a company may operate in one place. Your trip is not in one place. The firms worth shortlisting are the ones that can describe, without prompting, exactly where their own authority ends and a licensed partner’s begins, and who remains accountable across the join.

For the EA or chief of staff who owns the calendar, that is also the practical test. The provider who can explain the join is the one who can still get your principal into the room on Thursday morning in the third city.

If your travel is Brazil-only, the country-level checks are different and considerably more concrete. We keep a separate 15-point due-diligence checklist for that case.

Sources cited

• UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on the use of mercenaries — comparative report on national private security legislation, South American countries
• Ministerio de Seguridad, Provincia de Buenos Aires (Argentina) — Ley 12.297, article 21 (authorisation held in other jurisdictions does not substitute)
• Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile — Ley N° 21.659 sobre Seguridad Privada (in force 28 November 2025)
• Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile — Decreto 209/2024, Reglamento de Seguridad Privada
• Subsecretaría de Prevención del Delito (Chile) — Congress passes law extending certification deadlines for private security workers (Ley N° 21.825, 28 May 2026)
• Función Pública (Colombia) — Decreto-Ley 356 de 1994, Estatuto de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada (arts. 12, 16)
• Función Pública (Colombia) — Decreto-Ley 2535 de 1993, control de armas (art. 77, one weapon per three guards)
• Cámara de Diputados (México) — Ley Federal de Seguridad Privada (arts. 1, 16, 25, 26)
• Congreso de la República (Perú) — Ley 31615, amending Decreto Legislativo 1213 on private security services
• Organization of American States — Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms (CIFTA)

Related reading

• How to vet executive protection providers in Brazil: the 15-point due-diligence checklist
• What to ask a Brazilian security vendor
• Best executive protection firms in Brazil
• Executive protection services
• Security for family offices